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Collaborating with Relational References 
By Gerry Stahl, Drexel University 
For presentation at AERA 04, San Diego, CA 
 
A previous analysis of the data considered here used a simple 
concept of reference in which an utterance refers to an 
identifiable object in the world – a specific rocket description in 
the simulation list. In this paper, the analysis is deepened to 
reveal the learning by the group of students of a more 
sophisticated reference that involves pairs of objects compared in 
a subtle way. Mastering practices that define such reference is 
necessary for conducting collaborative scientific experiments 
involving controlled variables. This accomplishment is achieved 
by the group of students as a whole, working with computer-
based artifacts under the guidance of an adult mentor. The group 
of students in the previous paper encountered confusion about 
which rockets they were referring to in their talk-in-interaction. 
In this paper, it becomes clear that their task of referring was 
complicated; it involved a new way of looking at the meanings 
embedded in the simulation artifact. 
EMBEDDING MEANING IN SOFTWARE 
Several years ago I met Tony Petrosino at a conference and was 
intrigued by his research on using model rockets to teach science to 
disaffected middle school students in Texas. He explained that the use 
of model rockets is quite widespread in middle school curriculum and 
that kits for building model rockets with a variety of rocket engines are 
readily available. Since we were at a computer-oriented conference, 
Tony and I started talking about developing a computer simulation of 
model rockets to supplement his curriculum. 
When I returned to my office, I discussed the idea with Alex 
Repenning, my office mate at the time and the developer of 
Agentsheets, a software environment for end-user programming of 
simulations. We decided that this would be a good exercise for me to 
undertake in learning more about Agentsheets. So I got some data from 
Tony about the effects of different rocket options on the flight of model 
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rockets and I programmed a simulation. Using the Agentsheets visual 
programming language (Repenning & Sumner, 1995), I defined the 
behavior of rockets to correspond roughly to Newton’s laws, taking 
into account different air resistances due to rocket shape and texture 
(based on Tony’s data), the thrust of the different rocket engines and 
gravity. I translated Newton’s laws into difference equations for 
computing a rocket height at every time slice of the simulation. Then I 
added a random factor (“weather conditions”) to make predictions more 
interesting. While middle school students do not know the equations of 
physics, they can find averages on their calculators to take into account 
the random noise. 
At the time, I was working with two middle school classes, 
developing software for them to practice writing summaries. In the 
Spring, these classes broke into special science projects, for which 
parents and community members were encouraged to volunteer. The 
classroom teachers I was working with invited me to mentor a model 
rocket group, and I proposed to spend two hour-and-a-half sessions 
with them using my new simulation. 
I was curious to see what kids in the space age really understand 
about rockets and scientific method. In particular, I wondered if they 
understood the basic principle of experimentation: varying only one 
attribute at a time while holding the others constant. So I equipped the 
simulation with 7 rockets whose configurations would allow one to 
measure the effects of each rocket variable and then predict the 
behavior of an 8th rocket.  
But more than just being curious about what a certain group of 
students knew, I was interested in studying how middle school students 
would go about learning about a new software tool. I thought that 
having them work in a group would make their learning visible to me. 
So I decided to videotape them in order to capture a record of their 
learning. 
Of course, students these days are adept at using software and at 
discovering its functionality based on hours of time spent with video 
games and similar devices. However, what I was asking them to learn 
was different. They had to learn the structure of the list of rockets and 
learn how to take advantage of that structure to complete certain 
computational tasks. In other words, I was embedding some meaning in 
the simulation and they would have to come to understand that 
meaning. One can conceptualize any software program as the 
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embodiment of meaning that was programmed into its appearance and 
its behavior. For instance, the meaning of certain icons and menu items 
in a word processing program has to do with determining fonts for text. 
To understand that program, one must learn about fonts and their use, 
as well as about how to manipulate fonts using the interface icons. 
One can say that a computer software program is an artifact that 
embodies “inferred,” “referred,” “derived” or “stored” intentionality. 
That is, the software designer programmed meanings or intentions into 
the software, and these allow the software to behave in a meaningful 
way. A clear example of this is given in artificial intelligence. An AI 
program is supposed to exhibit human-like intelligence in responding 
to inputs. Of course, that is only possible if the programmer reduced 
some limited domain of intelligent behavior to algorithmic rules (or 
heuristic rules that were close enough to mimic human decisions most 
of the time) and then programmed these into the software. The meaning 
of the software’s behavior is derived from the human software 
designer’s symbolic external representations (Keil-Slawik, 1992) in the 
programming language. The user notices traces of the designer’s 
intention in the form of the operational software artifact. The meaning 
is referred from its source in the designer to its appearance in the 
interface, much as “referred pain” appears in a different part of the 
body from its causal source. The software embodies designer 
intelligence analogously to how commodities and machinery embody 
“stored” or “dead” human labor in a way that determines their 
exchange value according to Marx (1867/1976). In the case of the 
computer simulation, not only the temporal behavior of the rocket but 
also the useful arrangement of the rocket attributes in the list of rockets 
are intentional artifacts whose meaning was structured by the designer. 
VARIETIES OF MEANINGFUL ARTIFACTS 
We can distinguish different categories of meaningful artifacts: 
• physical artifacts 
• symbolic artifacts 
• computational artifacts 
• cognitive artifacts 
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By definition, an artifact is something man-made. We might think of 
an arrowhead, pot shard or figurine unearthed by an anthropologist. 
The physical artifact is made out of some material that has survived 
thousands of years. It has a form or outer appearance that displays some 
purpose or meaning and that shows that it was made by a person, by a 
designer who embedded that meaning in it. We may not be sure exactly 
how to interpret the meaning – whether a given figurine is religious, 
magical, fertility enhancing, artistic, a child’s doll, a remembrance of 
an important individual or a decoration – but we know that we are in 
the presence of a meaning and we know that someone at some time in 
the distant past intended the artifact to have a meaning. We are tempted 
to attribute some interpretation to the meaning. With our interpretation 
comes a glimpse into a faint and distant world: a culture within which 
this artifact was once transparently integrated. 
A physical artifact embodies meaning in the physical world. Our 
folk theories influenced by Descartes’ conceptualizations think of the 
meanings as something purely mental, divorced from the physical 
world. According to this view, meanings are ideas we have in our heads 
about things in the world. But if we consider the nature of artifacts, we 
soon realize that the physical world is full of mental meanings, the 
world is meaning-full – not because I as an observer apply values and 
meanings to things I see, but because practically everything in our 
world has been made by people and has been designed to have specific 
meanings. Our shared culture makes these meanings available to us all. 
Even the rare glimpses we get of nature are imbued with historical or 
aesthetic dimensions; they are measured by what it would take for us to 
climb or touch or paint them; they are framed by the eye of an architect, 
landscaper or urban planner who purposely left them for us to glimpse. 
The very concept of nature is so socially-mediated that any sharp 
separation of meaning and the physical is misguided. 
And vice versa. Symbolic artifacts are not completely ethereal. 
Words appear in sounds, ink or pixels. They could scarcely do their 
jobs as conveyors of meaning from one person to another if they did 
not appear in the physical world where they could be perceived and 
shared. Symbols do not come from nowhere; nor are we born with them 
inside us, like the neurons of our brains. We learn the meaning and use 
of symbolic artifacts — the words of our languages and of our language 
games — from our activities in the world, primarily from interacting 
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verbally with our care-givers, our siblings, our childhood best friends, 
our various teachers and other people. 
Artifacts have been around as long as humans, although the concept 
of artifact as a bridge across the mind/body distinction has only played 
a central role in philosophical ontologies since (Heidegger, 1927/1996), 
(Benjamin, 1936/1969) and (Vygotsky, 1930/1978). However, 
computational artifacts are a relatively new phenomenon. An artifact 
like the SimRocket simulation enlivens with computational power 
the meaning that is programmed into the software bits. The rocket icon 
moves with a behavior whose meaning was programmed in by the 
designer, although carefully designed random and interactive elements 
make the precise behavior unpredictable, as well as dependent upon the 
user’s actions. The computational, interactive artifact has a different 
kind of complexity than the prehistoric arrowhead – although the 
crafting of some arrow heads may have been so skilled that they are 
impossible to duplicate today. While it may be hard to specify precisely 
how meaning and physicality are merged in the bits of software that 
can be limitlessly duplicated and reconfigured, it seems clear that 
effective usage presupposes that the user recover the meaning of the 
software that was designed in there to empower the user. 
In educational contexts there is an expectation that the meaning will 
be taken a further step: that the lessons will be learned, that is that 
whatever meaning is unearthed with the artifacts will be internalized by 
the student. This expectation does not necessarily entail a return to the 
view that meanings exist in minds. Rather, the expectation is that the 
student will be able to make use of the meaning learned from an 
encounter with a physical, symbolic or computational artifact in one 
situation when the student is in a new situation in which that meaning 
might again be relevant. Without speculating about what might be 
involved in the student internalizing a meaning, we simply look at the 
student interpreting the meaning in the original situation and then using 
this experience as a resource for constructing some similar form of 
meaning in a new practical situation in the world.  
Vygotsky recognized that we do have an inner mental life and he 
succeeded in relating our mental life to our social life in the world by 
arguing that our private mental world was an internalization of the 
primary shared social world. We learn to speak, act and be in the world 
by interacting with other people and by sharing a culture and a 
meaningful world with them. As we begin to master these as a young 
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child, we start to talk to ourselves — first out loud and then silently. 
We follow a similar sequence with reading — and then with debate and 
other social skills. In each case, when we internalize a skill it undergoes 
a complex sequence of transformations, eventually becoming a 
cognitive artifact, a mental tool. For instance, an arrowhead might 
allow us to kill our prey in the world, the language of hunting allows us 
to discuss group plans for an expedition, a computer lets us simulate 
hunting scenarios and the internalized language lets us imagine a 
glorious hunt. The nature of the hunt is different depending on whether 
it is mediated by a physical, symbolic, computational or cognitive 
artifact. The silent self-talk that Vygotsky analyzed is the start of the 
stream of consciousness that forms our private mental life. Various 
skills like the ability to construct narratives (Bruner, 1990) and to give 
an account of our actions (Garfinkel, 1967) enrich that life.  
In this paper we want to observe how a new cognitive artifact can 
evolve out of social interaction involving a computational artifact. How 
do the students develop the cognitive skill of comparing experimental 
cases with various attributes? 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROCKET LIST 
The SimRocket applet is a computational artifact. It includes the 
simulation panel of the rocket flight and the rocket list describing the 
available rockets. Based on Tony’s model rocket kits, I designed the 
simulation rockets to have four variable attributes:  
• Nose cone shape (rounded or pointed) 
• Number of fins (3 or 4) 
• Surface texture of body (painted or sanded) 
• Rocket engine (Big Bertha, Astro Alpha, Crazy Quasar, Giant 
Gamma) 
The rockets are paired in the list of available rockets (see Figure 1 in 
the previous paper (Stahl 2002) for a view of the actual screen). There 
are two rockets with each kind of engine. The first three pairs have 
identical attributes, except for one difference: 
• Rockets 1 and 2 differ in nose cone shape 
• Rockets 3 and 4 differ in number of fins 
• Rockets 5 and 6 differ in body texture 
• Rockets 7 and 8 differ in nose cone, fins and body 
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The computer simulation was carefully designed with this particular set 
of rockets. This set of rockets allows the user to determine the effect of 
the different attributes on the flight of the rocket by, in effect, holding 
all variables but one at a time constant. Thus, one can determine the 
effect of nose cone shape by comparing flights of rockets 1 and 2; of 
number of fins with rockets 3 and 4; of body texture with rockets 5 and 
6. These effects can then be combined to predict how rocket 8 will fly, 
given the flight of rocket 7, which differs from rocket 8 by these three 
attributes.  
There are other sets of configured rockets that would allow similar 
calculations and predictions. Rather than varying attributes in pairs of 
rockets (call this “paired configurations”), one could compare a set of 
different rockets to one common standard (call this “standard 
configurations”). For instance, rockets 2, 3, and 4 could each differ 
from rocket 1 by a different individual attribute. Then, rockets 5, 6 and 
7 could be like rocket 1, but have the different engines. This would also 
allow one to compute the effects of each attribute singly and combine 
them to predict any configuration of rocket 8. Either this standard 
configurations combination of 7 rockets or the paired configurations 
combination above allows one to compute the dynamics of all 32 
possible rocket configurations using a set of just 7 different rockets. 
Using the contrast just made of paired configurations to standard 
configurations, we can better understand the breakdown analyzed in the 
previous paper. The students discovered that rockets 3 and 4 could be 
compared to determine the best fin configuration because 4 was a 
variation of 3. They then sought a variation of rocket 3 that could be 
analogously compared for nose cone shape. The students were 
assuming a standard configurations model in which everything is 
compared to one standard rocket (rocket 3). 
However, the rocket list is, in fact, structured with paired 
configurations. Brent’s gesture first draws attention to a pair with the 
needed difference, using a paired configurations model. The result of 
the subsequent collaborative interaction is to reach a consensus in 
which the whole group takes the pair (rocket 1 and 2) as the focus of 
comparison, rather than insisting on looking for a variation of the 
standard rocket 4 engine. 
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UNCOVERING EMBEDDED MEANING 
At this point it may seem obvious to the adult reader how one should 
compare rockets in the SimRocket list to find out the effects of the 
different attributes. However, it clearly was not obvious to the young 
students. We saw in the last paper how their references to rockets to be 
compared became quite confused. It presented the occasion for an 
exceptional interaction among the students to sort out this breakdown 
in the references. They accomplished this efficiently, with the use of 
brief, productive utterances that are hard for an observer to interpret but 
proved to be incredibly effective within the discourse. Once the 
references were resolved and accepted as shared by the group, the 
students were able to quickly draw the scientific conclusions about 
rocket characteristics. They then displayed in their talk their mastery of 
how to compare rockets. They accomplished this not by talking about 
“controlling variables” – such adult (schooled, professional) 
terminology was never used – but by making the proper use of their 
data. They learned the principle of scientific comparison in the 
practical, situated sense that they could actually carry out the 
appropriate operations on their data. 
The learning that we uncovered in the collaborative moment 
transcript played a key role in the larger classroom session. It is now 
possible to review the larger transcript and find statements in which 
learning associated with the issue addressed in the collaborative 
moment is also expressed – following the hermeneutic principle that 
interpretation must go back and forth between part and whole.  
During the ten minutes surrounding the thirty-second moment (from 
about 1:17 to 1:27), where the teacher and students discussed how to 
analyze their rocket data, the group understanding went from a rather 
naïve and vague sense of how to use the list artifact to a very clear and 
explicit appreciation of the meaning of that artifact and a practical 
knowledge of how to use it to achieve useful and meaningful results. 
Following are a series of excerpts from the longer transcript that 
illustrate this development, by presenting significant statements that 
expressed the evolving group understanding. They are given here in ten 
stages: 
 
• Stage a, Chuck expressed the group’s assumption that one could 
simply adopt all the features of the rocket that flew the highest. 
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When the teacher suggested that a particularly strong engine could 
mask the differences caused by the other features, the students were 
at a loss on how to proceed without strong guidance from the 
teacher, leading up to the collaborative moment with its 
breakthrough insight. 
 
1:17:01 Chuck We’ll just go with number one uh (.) an that did the best, (.) or 
something, out of all ours compa:red 
 
• Stage b, after some discussion of statistical analysis, Steven still 
articulates the same group position as Chuck had, to go with all the 
features of the best rocket. 
 
1:17:44 Steven Well we’d look at- (.) we’d look at the graph that we do an see which 
has ( uh ) the ↑best. An whichever has the ↑best like rocket one 
two n three or- so on, (.) .h n whichever has the best we’d look to 
see if it has a rounded, or a pointed, which (.) which ours shows so 
far, that a ↑rounded, (.) that a ↑rounded is better? 
 
• Stage c, Jamie suggests to see whether the set of rockets with 
pointed noses does better overall than those with rounded noses, 
assuming that this kind of averaging will cancel the effects of the 
other features. 
 
1:18:29 Jamie Well what you do is you take every one that has a rounded nose an 
every one with a (.) pointed nose. (0.4) an you see which (0.2) one 
did better overall 
 
• Stage d, Chuck has the idea of manipulating one feature at a time 
while holding the others constant, but he wants to do this on 
physical model rockets (made out of soda pop bottles) rather than 
applying it to the data he just collected from the simulation. 
 
1:18:36  Chuck Yeah if you could bring in one that (.) like two two liter pop bottles 
you know that’s (.) make one with a ↑pointed nosecone n one with 
a ↑rounded nosecone. an see which one did better .hh so then we 
c’d go with that one an then add the feature that was on that one to 
the other one .hh an whatever features you put on here, (.) you 
leave off of (1.0) that- uh off of the other one .hh that way you c’n j’s 
see which one will fly. (.) ‘F the features on this one didn’ work then 
we take th’m off and then go from there.  
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• Stage e, Jamie is ready to use the data from the simulation, but 
returns to the idea of finding which did “better overall.” 
 
1:19:05 Jamie  You can use the simulation by .h finding out (.) j’st which one has a 
rounded nose and which one has a pointed nose? (.) and which one 
did better overall. (0.8) Like w- (.) which (.) rockets like (.) if (.) only 
one rocket with a rounded nose .h did good, then (.) a rounded nose 
(.) isn’t very good, (.) but like if. yeah but like if all the rounded 
noses are good, (.) compared to the pointed nose, then the rounded 
nose- noses are good.  
 
• Stage f, Chuck solves the problem for fins using the simulation and 
identifying rockets 3 and 4 on the list as having the necessary 
characteristics for valid comparison. 
 
1:20:30 Teacher So how would you find out which is better four fins or three fins. 
(1.0) 
 Chuck By launching (   ) with two different things on it– 
  Teacher –Which one – which two. 
 Chuck one with fou::r (.) n one with three: like (0.6) rocket four an rocket 
one. (0.8) Err no – (.) Ro:cke:ts, (.) fou:r, n rocket three. Cuz they 
both have the same engine. (0.8) An they both have the same 
nosecones. 
 
• Stage g, Chuck wants to change the simulation to create a 
comparable pair of rockets. He is willing to use the simulation, but 
has not looked carefully through the list to find what he needs. 
 
1:20:03 Chuck see ‘f you guys c’d make one .h wha– with an astro (.) alpha 
engine four fins and pointed nosecone, (1.6) w’ll see if you c’d do, 
(.) uh cha:nge all this around n stuff so that .hh you might get (  ) 
you also – .hh have an option of a pointed nosecone like – 
((swallow)) .hh you could (.) kinda like in HyperStudio .hh if you 
were tuh (.) like (.) click on this .h it would give you (.) all kinds of 
things th’t you (.) ought – like (.) on the (.) pointy nosecone (.) .h 
you c’d switch it to a rounded nosecone .h and the fins, 
 
• Stage h is the collaborative moment analyzed in the previous paper. 
At 1:22:21 Jamie turns to his data sheet and compares the data for 
rockets one and two, concluding that because rocket one went 
higher than rocket two and the only difference between them is that 
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rocket one has a rounded nose cone, then a rounded nose cone is 
preferable. 
• Stage i, Steven explicitly describes the structure of the list for doing 
the task for all features of the simulation rockets. He says, “I think 
it [the structured list] is good how it is,” fully appreciating that the 
necessary pairs have been built into the list. 
 
1:24:46  Steven What we would do is test (.) test (.) uh- rocket three and rocket four, 
(.) cuz they both have a rounded nose they both (.) have that astro 
alpha engine n they- (.) n one has three one has four fins. I think it’s 
good how it is because .hh every rocket has somep’n different. Like 
if you tested (.) five and six, then it- (.) they have the crazy uh- (.) 
quasar engine, .h they both have the crazy quasar engine, they 
both have the rounded .h nose they both have three fins, except th’t 
if- if we uh- if we tested those two, we’d be - testing for thuh- uh 
painted body or uh -- a sanded body, (.) so I like it how it is.  
 
• Stage j, the whole group is in agreement about how to use the list 
and they are able to collaboratively draw scientific conclusions with 
its help.  
 
1:26:46 Brent I would say that three is better than four 
 Jamie             three is better than four (          )= 
  Chuck Yeah, three is better than four so= 
 Teacher =So your rocket 
  Chuck        (we want)    three fins n a rounded nosecone 
 Teacher                                       Your rocket three 
goes up higher ‘n rocket four= 
  students Yeah ((multiple voices)) 
 Teacher So that means that three fins is better ‘n four. 
 
By solving a sequence of problems that the teacher guided them 
through, the students developed an increasingly robust working 
knowledge of the fundamental principle of scientific experimentation, 
that only one variable should be varied while the others are held 
constant. Although this principle was built into the simulation’s list of 
rocket descriptions and although the students started the classroom 
session by reading this list aloud and discussing it, they were not able 
to use this feature of the list in analyzing the data they collected until 
they worked through the preceding ten stages. Even as bright, 
motivated middle-school students, they were not developmentally able 
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to grasp the principle on their own. However, this ability did lie within 
their zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1930/1978), and they 
succeeded in attaining it through a scaffolded collaborative process. 
ARTICULATING MEANING 
How was the meaning of the rocket list as a set of paired configurations 
constructed by the group of students? In reviewing ten stages of 
understanding that evolved in the group during the ten minutes 
surrounding the half-minute moment of collaboration, we have seen 
that the group went from simply wanting to identify the “best” rocket 
“overall” to proposing various methods of comparing rockets and then 
– after the intensive collaborative moment – to understanding the 
paired configuration and using it to complete their task.  
Let us return to the transcript in the previous paper to see in some 
detail how the pivotal insight developed. Consider the significant 
pauses of a second or two in the interaction at 1:21:54, 1:22:03 and 
1:22:07. 
 
1:21:53 Teacher And (0.1) you don’t have anything like that there? 
1:21:54  (2.0) 
1:21:56 Steven I don’t think so 
1:21:57 Jamie Not with the same engine 
1:21:58 Steven ┌ No 
 Jamie └ Not with the same 
1:21:59 Teacher With the same engine … but with a different (0.1) … nose 
cone?= 
1:22:01 Chuck ┌ =the same= 
 Jamie └ =Yeah, 
1:22:02 Chuck These are both (0.8) the same thing 
1:22:03  (1.0) 
1:22:04 Teacher Aw┌ right 
1:22:05 Brent      └ This one’s different  
1:22:06 Jamie Yeah, but it has same no… 
1:22:07  (1.0) 
 
The teacher starts with a question that points to the rocket list in order 
to reorient the group to the computational artifact that Chuck’s 
speculations about an alternative software have forgotten. The students 
do not respond immediately, but the teacher uses “wait time,” waiting 
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out the long silence and thereby encouraging the students to take the 
floor. Steven begins hesitantly to reject the implication of the teacher’s 
question, hedging his “No” as “I don’t think so” at first, but then 
confirming it when backed up by Jamie. Jamie justifies or clarifies the 
negative response with, “Not with the same engine.” He then repeats 
this utterance up to the word “same,” making that term focal. 
The teacher picks up on Jamie’s term “same” to explicate his term 
“like.” In asking, “And you don’t have anything like that here?” the 
teacher was asking if there was a pair of rockets in the list on the 
computer monitor that could be used for determining the effect of the 
nose come shape the way that Chuck’s proposed software variation of 
rocket 3 or 4 would. Jamie’s response points out that there is no rocket 
in the list that could be paired with rocket 3 or 4 for this purpose 
because none of the other rockets have the same engine as rockets 3 
and 4. So the teacher adds the clarification: “With the same engine, but 
with a different nose cone,” repeating Jamie’s “same” as applied to the 
engine, and introducing the term “different” applied to the nose cone. 
Of course, this expanded version of the question is still ambiguous: 
it could be applied to either a list of paired configurations or one of 
standard configurations. After Chuck and Jamie make unsuccessful 
attempts to respond to the issue of “the same,” the group falls silent. 
This is the point of aporia that Plato (350 BC/1961) considered the 
catalyst of insight: silent wonder in the presence of a question that one 
finally understands to be a captivating mystery. 
As if suddenly aroused from his intellectual slumber by a muse of 
scientific thought, Brent dramatically breaks the silence with “This 
one’s different.” Jamie does not see what is different and repeats what 
is the same. Another pause. 
Then Steven and Jamie – but not yet Chuck – demonstrate a change 
of interpretive perspective: 
 
1:22:07  (1.0) 
1:22:08 Chuck Pointy nose cone= 
1:22:09 Steven =Oh, yeah= 
1:22:10 Chuck =But it’s not the same engine 
1:22:11 Jamie Yeah, it is, = 
1:22:12 Brent =Yes it is, 
1:22:13 Jamie ┌ Compare two n one 
 Brent └ Number two 
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At first, they simply register a change of view and alignment with 
Brent. Then Janie and Brent make the new comparison explicit: 
“Compare two and one,” “Number two.” They continue to explicate: 
“Are the same,” “It’s the same engine,” “So if you compare two and 
one,” until Chuck sees things their way: “Oh yeah, I see, I see, I see.” 
The crucial move is to look at rockets 1 and 2 as a paired configuration. 
Then one can see that they both have the same engine (and the same 
other attributes, except nose cone), so they can be compared for 
different nose cones. 
In this analysis, we see that the terms same, different and compare 
have become focal to the discourse. These are terms that relate two 
objects. So references using these terms refer to pairs of objects. The 
discourse broke down until the reference of the teacher’s question 
could be interpreted by all the students as being directed to the pair of 
rockets 1 and 2 instead of to a pair based on rocket 3 as a standard.  
All the participants in the discourse understood that the teacher’s 
rhetorical question was referencing a set of related rockets. It took 
several interactions to shift everyone’s understanding from a model of 
standard configurations to one of paired configurations. Because the 
reference was to a relationship rather than to a single object, the 
breakdown in shared understanding could not be repaired by simply 
pointing, as Brent tried. It was necessary for Jamie and Stephen to take 
this further and explicitly name both of the objects and the relationship 
(compare) itself. 
DISCOURSE AND UNDERSTANDING 
The unfolding of the collaborative moment reveals a subtle interplay 
between the group discourse and the understandings of the individual 
participants. This interplay becomes visible during a breakdown in the 
discourse – caused by a non-alignment of the individual interpretations. 
The character of this interplay does not lend itself to description using 
traditional conceptualizations of meaning and minds. In particular, we 
are tempted to say that the students had various ideas in their heads; 
that they expressed these ideas in their utterances; and that they 
changed their ideas in the course of the interaction. However, we have 
no evidence about ideas in their heads beyond the utterances (and other 
interaction behaviors) themselves. Nor did the participants have any 
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evidence about mental states of their co-collaborators, other than the 
same utterances that we have as observers. The only meanings that we 
(or they) have access to are those embodied in the utterances of the 
discourse themselves. 
Nevertheless, the question arises as to how some of the participants 
could (according to our analysis above) understand the shared discourse 
in different ways, resulting in the breakdown as well as its gradual 
repair. It seems clear that there are two different levels of meaning-
making taking place: a group level on which meaning is built up 
through discourse in which everyone participates, and an individual 
level on which each participant constructs his own evolving 
understanding of the references and other features of the discourse. In 
particular, the pauses in the collaborative interaction and the arguments 
in the group discourse seem to stimulate – whether by applying some 
kind of social pressure or simply by opening up a creative space – 
reinterpretations by the individuals. 
We already observed in the previous paper that most of the 
individual utterances had little meaning on their own if viewed in 
isolation. The meaning was constructed at the level of (in the context 
of) the group discourse, through the references of words, phrases, 
gestures and glances to elements in the discourse, the social interaction, 
the associated artifacts and the physical space. A word like same 
derives its lexical meaning from its contrast to different, its use in 
compare, etc. It also builds up its socially-shared meaning from 
repeated uses of it and related terms. It is common in discourse for one 
speaker to repeat a term that someone else recently used, as a way of 
referencing the previous occurrence. In this way, the term takes on a 
role in the discourse that cannot be attributed to an individual as the 
expression of a mental idea. The word is better analyzed as a resource 
for interaction that is shared by the group. While we may not know 
quite what a certain student meant when uttering a term, we can see 
how it was interactionally picked up by others and how it came to play 
a role in the group discourse. The terms used in the discourse gradually 
form a web of meaning, which specifies and deepens the meaning of 
the various terms within this context. One can say that the students, as 
individual speakers in the interaction, learn over time to understand 
these terms more deeply (as quasi-technical terms) and to use them 
more skillfully (as fledgling scientists). Alternatively, one can say that 
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the group discourse progressively refines the shared group meaning of 
the terms. 
The terms same, different and compare are everyday words used to 
describe a relational reference that might be discussed in terms of 
“holding variables constant” in scientific jargon. At different points 
during the collaborative moment, each student shifted his 
understanding of this relational reference from a model of standard 
configurations to one of paired configurations. This shift during the 
collaborative moment was an important feature of the interplay 
between the group discourse and the individual understandings. 
This analysis suggests that collaboration may often take place with 
the following structure: 
a. A group is engaged in building meaning in its discourse. 
b. Each participant develops an individual understanding of the 
meaning of the discourse in parallel to the group interaction. 
c. Participation in the group interaction is affected by the 
individual understandings; the individual contributions to the 
discourse reflect the distinctive understandings, but 
simultaneously merge into the creation of the discourse’s group-
level meaning. 
d. Individual understandings are visible (to other participants and 
to observers) in the interactions of the participants in the group – 
as nuances in how their contributions are integrated into the 
discourse. The trajectory of an individual’s contributions can be 
seen as a personal narrative within the history of the group 
interaction. 
Such a structure would have important implications for how 
individual learning can result from group collaboration. If group 
learning and individual learning proceed in parallel as different 
interpretive facets of a single, complexly interacting process, then we 
can look for both group and individual learning taking place in all 
collaborative settings, not just those in which an individual division of 
labor is explicitly introduced. For instance, in the previous paper’s 
moment of collaboration, the task of isolating the nose cone effect was 
accomplished by the group as a whole. Individuals were not assigned 
sub-tasks or roles. However, an essential, though unstated feature of the 
collaboration was that each individual had to understand the 
accomplishment of the group task. Each individual took responsibility 
for making sure that the others shared a common understanding. This 
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responsibility can be seen to be at work in motivating the various 
contributions to the discourse. In fact, the intense collaboration was 
precisely an attempt to re-establish shared understanding during a 
breakdown of it. As individuals started to understand the relational 
reference that was the key to accomplishing the task, they focused on 
bringing the other participants around to sharing that understanding. 
Only when all participants acknowledged that their individual 
understanding of the group meaning was aligned with the others’, did 
the group proceed to look at the data sheet in accordance with the 
relational reference to rockets 1 and 2 and solve the nose cone task.  
The parallel working of group and individual learning is often 
overlooked when investigating collaboration. Either one focuses on the 
individual learning and misses the group-level phenomena, failing to 
identify the process as collaborative, or one focuses on the group 
interaction and assumes that special interventions – role definitions, 
task divisions, jig-sawing, reflection, reporting – are necessary to 
stimulate individual effects. In our case study, however, we see that the 
participants have spontaneously organized their interaction to ensure 
that each individual understanding of the meaning of the group 
discourse was aligned in agreement with each other. This was 
necessary for the discourse and the problem-solving to proceed, Of 
course, such agreement is not absolute in any sense, but adheres to 
practical criteria having to do with permitting the collaboration to 
continue. The result of this natural structuring of the collaborative 
process is that the individuals learn in parallel with the group learning. 
Our view of the discourse and the interaction generally made visible the 
learning at both levels. 
The point is not that explicitly introducing individual roles into a 
group process is necessarily a bad idea; such pedagogical techniques 
have indeed proved useful in certain settings. Rather, the point is that 
individual learning may automatically take place within collaborative 
interactions. This suggests a response to the argument that group 
learning is irrelevant because the group will eventually break up and 
that we therefore need to focus on individual learning. On the contrary, 
it may be that group learning often supplies an essential basis for 
individual learning, providing not only the cultural background, the 
motivational support and the interactional occasion, but also an 
effective mechanism for ensuring individual learning. 
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